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KOREMATSU, HAWAII, AND PEDAGOGY 
Sanford Levinson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE TYRANNY OF SCARCE 
TIME WHEN “INTRODUCING” CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
I begin with some reflections on my own career in 
teaching—or, perhaps, attempting to teach—American 
constitutional law to generations of students from 1975 to the 
present.  Or, more accurately, until about three years ago, when I 
taught introductory constitutional law for the last time.  I am quite 
happy to no longer be teaching that course, whatever joys it did 
provide me in the past, for a very simple reason:  I became more 
and more frustrated by the demands of coverage, i.e., the duty to 
take up a variety of topics—including attendant cases and 
collateral materials—and the unfortunate certainty that what I was 
in fact doing was, at best, the barest skimming of rich surfaces.  
As a matter of fact, I am quite certain that I covered far less 
material than most of my colleagues, but that did almost nothing 
to alleviate my constant feeling, freely expressed to the students, 
that we were in fact “racing” through the material and, therefore, 
doing genuine intellectual justice to almost nothing that was 
ostensibly being discussed.  I compared the course to a college 
“mixer” where one engaged in several superficial conversations 
hoping to elicit just enough information to know whether it might 
be desirable to seek out further contact.   
My ideal course, it turns out, is the one I taught at the 
University of Texas three years ago in lieu of the introductory 
course, where we spent the entire semester on four cases and two 
speeches.  I believe I titled the course “Reading Cases Really 
Closely.”  The course opened with James Madison’s speech on 
the (un)constitutionality of the proposal to charter the Bank of the 
United States, on which we spent several days, followed by seven 
 
        * W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
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full weeks on the case upholding the charter of the Second Bank, 
McCulloch v. Maryland.1  We spent much of the time reading the 
speech and case aloud, with frequent stops, sometimes after every 
sentence, to discuss the argument being presented—or, often, 
implied without full elaboration.  Following spring vacation, we 
turned to the other cases—Strauder v. West Virginia,2 Home Bldg. 
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,3 several of the opinions in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,4 plus a speech by Frederick 
Douglass on constitutional interpretation.5  That was it, and even 
then, I felt that we were racing through the post-vacation 
materials, since so much more could have been said (and 
discussed) than we had time for.   
Indeed, I find one of the genuine oddities—perhaps 
“pathologies” would be the more appropriate term—of the 
American legal academy to be its pretense that it teaches students 
how to read and analyze cases.  How can that really be, given the 
remarkable paucity of time spent on any given case—and its 
actual text—that happens to be assigned?  Students almost never 
read a case in its entirety, and this is true even of the sections of 
an opinion that follow what are often histories of the procedure of 
the particular case and how it happened to arrive at the Court at 
all.  There is simply not the time.  I often compare the way we 
“introduce” constitutional law to impressionable students to a 
course, say, on “The American Novel” that would include two or 
three chapters from Moby Dick—a book some students might 
believe to be about whaling—before moving on to selected 
chapters from Huck Finn and so on.  There might be some value 
to such a course, but no one should believe that it has much to do 
with genuinely grappling with what either Melville or Twain 
wrote—or what they might have thought they were really writing 
about.  In the casebook that I co-edit, Processes of Constitutional 
 
1. See JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480-90 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (detailing the 
speech James Madison gave in Congress on Feb. 2, 1791 opposing the National Bank); see 
generally 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
2. See generally Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
3. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
4. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
[hereinafter Youngstown Steel v. Sawyer]. 
5. See generally Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-
Slavery or Anti-Slavery (1860), in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM VOLUME II: RIGHTS 
AND LIBERTIES (Howard Gillman et al. eds., 2013). 
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Decisionmaking, the one and only case that is reprinted without 
editing is McCulloch.6  All other cases are significantly edited, 
even though a feature of our very long casebook is that it includes 
fewer overall cases than do any of our competitors.  Those cases 
we include are less severely edited, but edited they most certainly 
are.  Perhaps it is worth noting that one of the very first seminars 
I ever gave at the University of Texas Law School, where I have 
now been teaching for forty years, focused on the editorial 
process itself.  Students were invited to offer their own edits of 
given cases, with memoranda supporting their decisions as to 
what to include and what to cut.  
I note, incidentally, that in the “Reading Cases Really 
Closely” course, we spent some significant time comparing how 
different casebooks presented the cases we were reading and what 
difference the editorial decisions made to one’s understanding of 
the case.  If, as is common, the “factual” background of the “case 
and controversy” was more-or-less omitted, then that raises 
obvious questions for students trying to “brief” the case.  What, 
are, for example, the “facts” of  Youngstown Steel v. Sawyer?7  
Hugo Black, in his majority opinion, barely informs the reader 
that something called the Korean War is going on, whereas Chief 
Justice Vinson, in his dissent, spends pages—never presented in 
casebooks—explaining why that War is in fact the opening battle 
of World War III.8 
So, what does this have to do with responding to Mark 
Killenbeck’s truly superb article on Korematsu (and, let us not 
forget, Hawaii)?9  The answer is simple.  I know of literally no 
article better suited to introduce students to the complexities of 
constitutional analysis, though the caveat is that such an 
introduction would require spending an extensive amount of time 
not only on the cases themselves, but also, and just as importantly, 
on the absolutely crucial questions that Killenbeck asks on almost 
literally every page.  This is not an article to be skimmed.  It must 
be grappled with in just the same way that Killenbeck does for 
 
6.  PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 39 (7th ed. 2018). 
7. See generally Youngstown Steel v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
8. Id. at 582-84 (majority opinion); see also id. at 668-73 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
9. See generally Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu 
Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV. 151 (2021). 
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104 manuscript pages.  Indeed, my one and only criticism of the 
essay is that it is too short.  I firmly believe that it can—and 
should—be doubled in size in order to become a truly essential 
book for students and their professors alike, on what “case 
analysis” really requires, unlike the desiccated version that 
professors feel forced to present given the tyrannical demands of 
“coverage” within a limited amount of time. 
A full “commentary” or “response” to the article could easily 
take up this entire journal, so I will limit myself to offering a few 
observations.  But the main message is to read every page that 
Killenbeck wrote with the utmost care. 
II.  WHO GETS TO OFFER AUTHORITATIVE 
DESCRIPTIONS OF KOREMATSU? 
It is appropriate to begin literally at the start of Killenbeck’s 
article in order to demonstrate the validity of the previous 
sentence.  The first sentence asks the reader to answer an 
important question: “How to best describe . . . Korematsu v. 
United States?”10  One might simply respond saying, altogether 
accurately, that it is one of the most reviled decisions of the 
twentieth century.  Unlike, say, Lochner v. New York, which was 
presented to several generations of students as a clear 
abomination before receiving revisionist approval from some 
contemporary scholars,11 Korematsu has no real advocates, 
especially in terms of its results, within the legal community.  If 
the “canon” of American constitutional law includes, at its best, 
those cases we are proud to present to students as models either 
of legal reasoning or moral sensitivity—and, ideally, both—then 
the “anticanon,” as elaborated by Columbia law professor Jamal 
Greene, includes cases that are, perhaps, best described as 
modeling terrible legal reasoning or abject moral obtuseness, 
often both.12  Thus, Killenbeck’s fourth sentence quotes 
 
10. Id. at 151. 
11. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1-3 (2011).  Other prominent defenders include 
Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and 
Persons, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334 (2005); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: What’s so Wicked About 
Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 325 (2005). 
12. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380-82 (2011).  
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Professor’s Greene own description of Korematsu as founded “on 
little more than naked racism and associated hokum,” 
exemplifying “a set of propositions that all legitimate 
constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute.”13  It is, 
together with Dred Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Lochner the 
leading exemplars of the “anticanon.”14  But Greene is merely a 
law professor, however distinguished.   
Far more important, of course, is the statement found early 
in paragraph two by Chief Justice Roberts in his opinion for the 
Court in Trump v. Hawaii.  Perhaps prodded by Justice 
Sotomayor, who unkindly (though some of us would say 
altogether correctly) suggested that Roberts’s opinion upholding 
President Trump’s ban on travelers from seven selected countries, 
all of which happened to be heavily Muslim, was reminiscent of 
the Court’s decision in Korematsu, Roberts almost gratuitously 
took the opportunity not merely to distinguish the two cases, but, 
more dramatically, to attempt to eviscerate Korematsu as part of 
the Supreme Court’s legacy.15  “Korematsu,” he proclaimed, 
“was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in 
the court of history, and—to be clear—’has no place in law under 
the Constitution.’”16   
Nothing that could really be described as an argument 
accompanied this statement.  There is no explanation as to why 
one of the most distinguished Supreme Courts in our history 
engaged in such an egregious error.  Were the Justices in the 
majority stupid?  Or were they out-and-out malevolent, setting 
aside their duties to the law in order to serve ulterior motives?  To 
describe them as knaves or as fools seems to be the only available 
option once one describes a decision as “wrong the day it was 
decided” and, in the words taken from Justice Jackson’s dissent, 
having “‘no place in law under the Constitution.’”17  What a 
wonderful opportunity to teach students about the rhetoric found 
in the Supreme Court.  And, importantly, only in the Supreme 
 
13. See id. at 380, 423.  My own reflections on Greene’s essay can be found at Sanford 
Levinson, Is Dred Scott Really the Worst Opinion of All Time? Why Prigg is Worse than 
Dred Scott (But Is Likely to Stay Out of the “Anticanon”), 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 23, 32 
(2012), https://perma.cc/3PC3-38V3.  
14. See Greene, supra note 12, at 380.  
15. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).  
16. Id. 
17. Id; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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Court, as distinguished, say, from opinions written by judges of 
what the Constitution is pleased to label “inferior courts.”18  They 
are required, according to the Supreme Court itself, to implement 
any and all Supreme Court precedents unless and until the Court 
itself declares that they are no longer “good law.”19  It really 
doesn’t matter if an “inferior” judge believes that a given 
Supreme Court opinion was “wrong the day it was decided.”20  
But Supreme Court justices are different.  As Justice Frankfurter 
explained in a 1939 concurring opinion overruling an 1871 
decision of the Supreme Court, justices take an oath to be faithful 
to the Constitution, not to prior cases of the Supreme Court.21  It 
appears, though, that as a matter of practice, that is not the correct 
interpretation of the linguistically similar oath that “inferior” 
judges take.  Indeed, it is worth asking about the meaning of the 
oath taken by presidents and all other public officials.   
Roberts’ sentence, precisely because it is unaccompanied by 
genuine argument, is perhaps a perfect example of what the 
English philosopher of language J. L. Austin labeled a 
“performative utterance.”22  Its very declaration by an authorized 
speaker—in this case the Chief Justice writing for a majority of 
the Court—is enough to establish it as true.23  As one might infer, 
it might be worth taking some class time both to discuss the nature 
of performative utterances and how it is that only some people are 
authorized to make them.  Professors fulminate against decisions 
with some frequency, and students quickly learn that whatever 
they say about the professor, the denunciations have no legal 
authority whatsoever.  It is as if a best friend, without any 
authority from the state, attempted to declare that A & B are now 
“lawfully married.”  Unless the state has invested authority to do 
so, perhaps because it recognizes the validity of a certificate 
issued by the Universal Life Church, that declaration has no more 
binding force than my own statement that a given decision of the 
Court is an unreasoned abomination (which I have been known to 
 
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
19. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994). 
20. See id.; see also Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
21. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).   
22. See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6-7 (1962). 
23. See id. at 8-9. 
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offer).  But that may be only to say that Professors Greene and 
myself are merely law professors, while John Roberts is 
authorized to make law, at least if he has the concurrence of four 
colleagues, which includes casting into judicial purgatory—if not 
outright Hell—an almost seventy-five-year-old case without 
briefing or argument before the Court itself.24 
One might well be curious where Roberts’ authority to make 
such performative legal utterances comes from.  Crucially, is it a 
product exclusively of the office that he inhabits—i.e., being a 
justice of the United States Supreme Court—or does it have 
anything at all to do with any personal characteristics he might 
have?  This invites a discussion of what qualifications, if any, 
someone must have in order to serve on the United States 
Supreme Court.  (One might begin by reading the text of the 
Constitution itself and comparing it, perhaps, with the text of 
some other national constitutions with regard to stating who is 
qualified to become a member of its apex court.)   
As a matter of fact, there is only one current member of the 
Supreme Court who is officially “learned in the law.”  That is 
Elena Kagan, and the reason is that in order to become Solicitor 
General of the United States, the office she inhabited prior to her 
appointment to the Court in 2011, she had to be officially judged 
to be “learned in the law.”25  (Perhaps it helped that she was Dean 
of the Harvard Law School!)  Indeed, one might well ask students 
if they in fact know anything at all about the nine members of the 
Supreme Court.  Who exactly are Samuel Alito or Stephen 
Breyer?  Or, if one really wants to be cruel, who were Sherman 
Minton, Harold Burton, Fred Vinson, and Tom Clark, Harry 
Truman’s four appointees who were distinguished principally by 
being friends of the President?   
What might it say about the American legal system that we 
take on faith, as it were, the binding nature of pronouncements by 
people about whom we often know almost nothing at all save for 
their occupying the relevant office?  Perhaps this would be an 
appropriate occasion for quoting one of the most terrifying 
passages in all of Shakespeare, from King Lear:  “Thou hast seen 
a farmer’s dog bark at a beggar?” Lear asks the blinded Earl of 
 
24. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 505. 
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Gloucester.26  Upon Gloucester’s agreement, Lear then observes, 
“And the creature run from the cur? There thou might’st behold 
the great image of authority: a dog’s obeyed in office.”27  Is this 
seditious, or simply a powerful truth about political authority, 
including the authority attached to judicial pronouncements? 
III.  KOREMATSU AS PART OF THE CANON (AND 
ANTICANON) 
We are only at the beginning of page six, and we have not 
yet even mentioned what Killenbeck himself regards as his main 
argument.  That argument, in fact, is that we ignore Korematsu—
or exile it from our syllabi—at our peril; he believes that it very 
much deserves to be part of what Jack Balkin and I once labeled 
the “pedagogical canon”28 that should be taught to all students 
because of the importance of the lessons it teaches.  Killenbeck 
demonstrates that the lessons are (at least) twofold, running in 
absolutely opposite directions.  It amply deserves its status as part 
of both the canon and what Greene labeled the “anticanon.”29  So 
unlike Mark Antony with Julius Caesar, Killenbeck comes both 
to praise and to condemn Korematsu, which is why his article is 
so important and worth closely reading.  He is no admirer of the 
actual holding of the case.  Indeed, he is harshly critical of the 
legal process that produced it, and by that he is referring not only 
to the arguments articulated in Justice Black’s Opinion for the 
Court, but also the lawyering of the Department of Justice, which 
almost certainly transgressed certain basic lines of legal ethics, 
discussed more below.30  He thinks it important that students 
know of all of this in order to understand that the law does not 
always work itself pure, that the process itself can be gravely 
defective, with attendant costs both to the fabric of the law and, 
more importantly, to the victims of the given decisions.31  But, as 
 
26. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR act 4, sc. 6. 
27. Id. 
28. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111  
HARV. L. REV. 963, 975 (1998). 
29. Greene, supra note 12, at 386. 
30. Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 180; see also infra Part IV. 
31. See Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 180-89. 
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already suggested, that is not the only reason that Killenbeck 
wants Korematsu to be taught.   
In addition, he applauds the decision for its formal doctrine, 
even if not for the application of the doctrine.  That is, Korematsu 
is a major source of the “strict scrutiny” doctrine with regard to 
the use of racial or national origin classifications in the law.32  The 
Equal Protection Clause, described in 1927 as the “last resort” of 
desperate lawyers unable to come up with a genuine legal 
argument,33 became, in part because of Korematsu, one of the 
linchpins of American constitutional argument following World 
War II.34  It would have been unthinkable seventy-five years ago 
to have a full-semester course on “The Equal Protection Clause;” 
indeed, one wonders if the Clause would even have supported two 
weeks of interrogation.  Today, on the other hand, the only 
question is whether a semester is long enough to handle all of the 
intricacies of doctrine produced by the movement of the Clause 
to center state.  Students ought to be aware of this aspect of 
American constitutional development, and Killenbeck’s 
treatment of Korematsu offers a splendid introduction to that 
development.   
So Korematsu is intensely interesting to doctrinalists, partly 
as an origin story, but, I want to suggest, also as a demonstration 
of the complexities of the doctrine itself.  Return to Professor 
Greene’s dismissal of Korematsu as exemplifying “naked racism” 
and little else.35  Chief Justice Roberts’ overruling of the case is 
congruent with this understanding: “The forcible relocation of 
U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the 
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of 
Presidential authority.”36  But is that in fact a correct description?  
What, after all, is the “racial category” that is the basis of the 
lamentable detention in what Roberts accurately calls 
“concentration camps?”37  The answer is deceptively simple:  it is 
membership within the Japanese nation, whether by birth, as with 
 
32. Id. at 189-201. 
33. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
34. See David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty Lies 
in the Hearts of Men and Women”, 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 14 (2011). 
35. Greene, supra note 12, at 423. 
36. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (emphasis added).   
37. Id. 
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those Japanese nationals who were in fact prohibited from 
becoming American citizens by dreadfully discriminatory 
naturalization laws,38  or, even if American citizens by virtue of 
having been born here, were nonetheless suspected of retaining a 
dangerous degree of national loyalty to their parents’ 
“homeland.”  And, of course, Korematsu takes place against the 
background that the political authorities claiming to represent that 
nation—including an Emperor who further claimed a Divine 
mandate to rule—had attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, 
with devastating consequences, on the day that President 
Roosevelt proclaimed would “live in infamy,” December 7, 
1941.39  Presidential Order 9066 was a response to Pearl Harbor 
and the perceived dangers coming from the organized Japanese 
nation.40 
When I used to teach Korematsu, one of my points is that it 
might force us to acknowledge the practical difference between 
mere “minimum rationality,” as a justification for governmental 
policy, and a “heightened” degree of scrutiny that would demand 
more than acknowledging the possibility that a non-lunatic might 
believe that a given policy “made sense.”41  That is, was it, at the 
beginning of 1942, truly “irrational” to believe that Japanese 
nationals, even if resident aliens within the United States, and 
even the children of those nationals, might be sufficiently torn in 
their loyalties to present potential dangers to American national 
security should, for example, Pearl Harbor be simply the 
forerunner to an attack on the continental United States itself?  We 
know now that that notion was fanciful, but was it necessarily so 
at the time?  But my point was that it might not be enough simply 
to concede that what might well be perceived as rank bigotry 
against Japanese nationals and their American-citizen children 
was not, for that reason, completely “irrational.”   
After all, as I pointed out, American policy for many decades 
was replete with what can only be described as such rank bigotry, 
 
38. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, repealed by 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163. 
39. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “December 7, 1941—A Date Which Will Live in Infamy”—
Address to the Congress Asking That a State of War Be Declared Between the United States 
and Japan (Dec. 8, 1941), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 514, 514 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941). 
40. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1448 (W.D. Wash. 1986). 
41. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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which, as a general matter, might well deserve to be described as 
“racist.”  After all, Fred Korematsu’s parents were not citizens 
because American law at the time prohibited all Asians from 
becoming citizens.42  That was modified in 1943 to allow Chinese 
immigrants to become citizens, no doubt because it was 
embarrassing to continue our traditional bigotry at a time when 
we were allied with the Republic of China in the great struggle 
against Japan in the Pacific theater of World War II.43  But it 
would not be until the 1950s that the ban against Asians in general 
would be lifted.44 
Killenbeck demonstrates beyond doubt that the detention of 
Japanese resident aliens and their American-citizen children was 
tainted by abject bigotry.45  All one needs to do is to read the 
comments of General DeWitt in that regard.46  But even if we 
agree with Killenbeck’s  assessment—and one of the 
achievements of his powerful essay is its elaboration of the depth 
of the bigotry behind the policy—the question remains, at least 
for me, as to whether Killenbeck is correct in writing of 
“Korematsu’s embrace of naked racial stereotyping.”47  Should 
we not at least acknowledge that “national origin discrimination” 
is analytically distinguishable from “racial stereotyping” and, 
therefore, must be taken on its own terms, even if we end up 
condemning both.  (Similar questions, of course, might be raised, 
as in Hawaii, by anti-Islam bigotry. Still, I assume that no one 
would describe Muslims as a “race.”  All forms of discrimination 
might be lamentable, but that does not lead to the conclusion that 
all forms are necessarily alike or can be neatly collapsed into one 
another without paying some genuine analytical costs.) 
So I will confess that in the past I was inclined to describe 
Presidential Order 9066 as meeting the test of “minimum 
rationality,” but, nonetheless, to affirm the validity of Justice 
Murphy’s eloquent dissent; that it was so draconian in its 
implications for the lives of the roughly 120,000 fellow 
 
42. JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS LEAGUE, THE JOURNEY FROM GOLD MOUNTAIN: THE 
ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 9-10 (2006). 
43. K. Scott Wong, The Opening of the Law in the Pursuit Asian American History, 13 
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 325, 325 (2010). 
44. Id. at 326 n.2. 
45. Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 167-76. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 156. 
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Americans (citizens or not) subjected to it that it should have been 
assessed by higher standards.48  Killenbeck demonstrates beyond 
doubt that it was indefensible under stricter scrutiny.49  There was 
simply no evidence of perfidy by enough persons of Japanese 
descent that it should have been regarded as acceptable to subject 
them as a collectivity to curfews and then detain and exile them 
into concentration camps far away from their homes.  Of course, 
there turned out to be no evidence of any perfidy by what might 
be termed the target population.  One might accurately take this 
as evidence of the remarkable loyalty of those rounded up to the 
United States, a conclusion only strengthened by the 
achievements of the famous 442nd Nisei regiment, composed of 
second-generation Japanese-Americans, that, while fighting in 
the European theater of operations, became the most decorated 
regiment in American military history, including twenty-one 
Medal of Honor winners.50  One of the reasons I regard this as 
“remarkable” is precisely that persons of Japanese ancestry had 
so many good reasons to feel angry—and perhaps even disloyal—
to a country that had systematically discriminated against them 
and refused to accept even the possibility that a Japanese 
immigrant might become part of the American political 
community.   
In this sense, Dred Scott lived well after its formal overruling 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.51  It might have made Fred 
Korematsu a citizen, but his parents remained permanently 
tainted.  To be sure, one might in fact describe that, at least prior 
to World War II, as evidence of “naked racism,” insofar as all 
non-Caucasians (other than immigrants from Africa, thanks to the 
1870 modification of the original, thoroughly racist immigration 
act of 1790 that Taney, of course, cited in Dred Scott), were 
barred from citizenship.52  But by 1942, the “naked racism” had 
surely been joined with an animosity based on ascribed 
membership in the particular Japanese community that had 
 
48. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 
JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS LEAGUE, supra note 42, at 29. 
49. Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 180-89. 
50. JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS LEAGUE, supra note 42, at 14, 31. 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
52. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 419 (1857); JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS 
LEAGUE, supra note 43, at 4. 
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chosen to attack the United States.  If one looks around the world 
at the history of ethnic- and nationality-based conflict, one finds 
all too often that deep animosities endure through decades and 
even centuries.  For starters, look at Northern Ireland, the South 
Balkans, or the unending conflicts in the Middle East.  It is often 
“rational” to expect the worst, even as visionary political 
leadership—think of Nelson Mandela—is willing to take a leap 
of faith and hope for the best.  I’m quite willing to argue that the 
Constitution requires such leaps, at least on occasion, but, surely, 
others disagree.  In any event, it seems clear that whatever the 
rhetoric adopted by Justice Black about “strict scrutiny,” the 
majority certainly did not apply it.53  It did, one might argue, apply 
a “compelling interest” test, but that is only to say that anything 
presented as relating to national security, especially during time 
of war, will in effect be rubber-stamped by the judiciary, exactly 
the situation that Justice Jackson warned against in his somewhat 
cryptic dissent.54 
Killenbeck, like many others, argues that whatever might 
rationally have been believed in the days after Pearl Harbor was 
disconfirmed by what was unequivocally known at the time of 
argument before the Court, which should have led the justices to 
invalidate 9066.55  This, of course, raises the general problem of 
the relevance of after-acquired information in evaluating policies 
determined at an earlier date, a subject that Killenbeck discusses 
at some informative length late in his article.  Much could be said 
about this general problem, but I will leave that for another day.   
IV.  LAWYERS AS TECHNICIANS 
The last topic I want to take up in these brief comments 
involves the pictures of lawyering depicted by Killenbeck, 
particularly in his attempt to contrast Korematsu with Hawaii.  
With regard to the former, I think it is fair to say that he presents 
a devastating portrayal of the lawyers who defended 9066 in front 
of the Supreme Court.56  They were fully aware of the unbridled 
 
53. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216; id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
54. See id. at 218; id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
55. Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 180-82. 
56. See id. at 176-80. 
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bigotry of General DeWitt, the architect of the detention policy.57  
More to the point, they were also fully aware that by the time the 
case was before the Court, there was literally no real evidence to 
support the policy.  That fact was brought to the attention of those 
in charge of litigation, and they basically did nothing.  They 
basically chose the role of zealous advocate, determined to justify 
the policy adopted by President Roosevelt in 1942.  The lawyers 
involved were not “nobodies,” as it were.  They included, among 
others, Charles Fahy and Herbert Wechsler.58  Fahy was Solicitor 
General of the United States from 1941 until 1945 and would later 
serve for many years as a member of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia.59  Wechsler, who joined the 
Columbia Law School faculty immediately after clerking for 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in 1931, served in the Department of 
Justice during the War and argued several cases before the 
Court.60  He would go on to serve as the long-time president of 
the American Law Institute.  It is safe to say that neither paid any 
professional price for the decisions they made in effect to 
suppress relevant evidence that might have conceivably been 
interesting to the Justices.   
Killenbeck is highly critical of the way that Korematsu was 
presented to the Court, precisely because there was solid evidence 
of the government’s overreach and, not to put too fine a point on 
it, bigotry as part of the explanation for that overreach.61  He is, 
however, far less critical of the lawyers for the Trump 
administration, who were equally successful in vindicating a 
highly controversial policy that its opponents viewed as equally 
overreaching and equally motivated by bigotry.  He emphasizes 
that the professionals in the Justice Department exercised their 
considerable legal skills in effect to denude the travel bans of the 
bigotry that were earlier attached to them, based in part on 
comments by Candidate Donald Trump and comments by his 
personal attorney, former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.62  
 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. Solicitor General: Charles Fahy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 31. 2014), 
https://perma.cc/JJ94-9GV5. 
60. See Dara E. Purvis, Herbert Wechsler, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://perma.cc/FFA8-LQ53 (last visited Mar. 17, 2021). 
61. See Killenbeck, supra note 9, at 176-80. 
62. See id. at 201-16. 
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Killenbeck acknowledges his suspicion that he is “in a distinct 
minority within the academy in believing that a respectable [albeit 
not totally convincing] argument can be made that by the third 
iteration of the Trump immigration order [the one before the 
Court], the adults in the room had purged the actual policy—and 
hopefully its implementation—of the childish promises that 
Candidate Trump had made as he pandered to his base.”63  He 
notes that Giuliani emphasized that Trump had appointed a 
“commission” that was charged to “do [what Trump wanted] 
legally.”64  What this meant, among other things, was to present 
“neutral” arguments that never once mentioned that the seven 
targeted countries were overwhelmingly Muslim.  Instead, the 
lawyers focused on the fact that the Obama Administration itself 
had expressed reservations about those seven countries and that 
there were reasons to believe that potential travelers from those 
countries needed more “extreme vetting” than is true of other 
potential entrants to the United States.   
I am not particularly interested in exploring whether one 
should in fact be so generous either to the lawyers or, even more 
to the point, the justices, led by Chief Justice Roberts, who 
endorsed the policy in terms of its fidelity to constitutional 
norms.65  Rather, in line with my general belief that the article 
provides an almost unparalleled entryway into grappling with 
what it means “to think like a constitutional lawyer,” I want to 
suggest that deep and profound issues are raised by how we 
choose to evaluate the lawyers in Hawaii. 
Consider in this context an op-ed published in the December 
20, 2020 New York Times with the remarkable title I’m Haunted 
by What I Did as a Lawyer in the Trump Justice Department.66  It 
was written by Erica Newland, a graduate of the Yale Law School 
who had served in the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) from 
2016-2018, i.e., the last year of the Obama Administration and 
the first full year of the Trump Administration.67  The OLC, of 
course, is one of the most prestigious divisions of the Department 
 
63. Id. at 201. 
64. Id.  
65. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417-21 (2018). 
66. Erica Newland, I’m Haunted by What I Did as a Lawyer in the Trump Justice 
Department, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/JU7N-5BK5. 
67. Id. 
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of Justice.  In many ways, it is more important than almost any 
federal court, including the United States Supreme Court, 
inasmuch as it is treated as offering dispositive opinions about 
many issues relating to presidential power.   
However important the OLC is as an empirical matter, it 
confounds standard explanations that law professors often give 
for the importance of Article III as establishing a truly 
“independent” judiciary, signified, among other ways, by life 
tenure.  No one at OLC has life tenure; the head of the OLC—
analogous to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—is a 
political appointee of the President (as is, one might argue, the 
Chief Justice, for that matter) who, unlike the Chief Justice, 
serves completely at the President’s pleasure.  Any 
“independence” of OLC attorneys is guaranteed only by the 
strength of their own characters and professional commitments, 
not by the institutional protections we generally believe necessary 
to protect such a separation from raw political pressure.  It 
perhaps should occasion no surprise that the OLC generally, even 
if not always, is an ally of the President when asked to opine on 
matters dealing with presidential authority.  It is, for example, 
only an opinion of the OLC and nothing else that has led to the 
debatable insistence that a president cannot be indicted for 
criminal misconduct during his administration, i.e., that 
impeachment (or electoral defeat) is the only remedy for such 
behavior.68  (This, of course, was the basis of Robert Mueller’s 
failure to indict Donald Trump as part of his own inquiries as 
Special Prosecutor).  To be sure, not all decisions participated in 
by the OLC are basically immune, at least empirically, from 
judicial review, and one of them involved Trump’s travel ban.   
So it is worth quoting Ms. Newland at some length: 
My job was to tailor the administration’s executive actions 
to make them lawful—in narrowing them, I could also make 
them less destructive. . . .  
But there was a trade-off:  We attorneys diminished the 
immediate harmful impacts of President Trump’s executive 
orders—but we also made them more palatable to the courts. 
 
68. Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. Legal Couns., 
Amenability of the President, Vice President and other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal 
Prosecution while in Office (Sept. 24, 1973). 
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This burst into public view early in the Trump administration 
in the litigation over the executive order banning travel from 
several predominantly Muslim countries, which my office 
approved.  The first Muslim ban was rushed out the door.  It 
was sweeping and sloppy; the courts quickly put a halt to it.  
The successive discriminatory bans benefited from more 
time and attention from the department’s lawyers, who 
narrowed them but also made them more technocratic and 
therefore harder for the courts to block.69 
Ms. Newland is ruthlessly forthright in her description of 
many of the lawyers who gathered around candidate Trump (and, 
one might add, around President Trump, especially after his 
defeat by Joe Biden in the November 2020 election).  The Trump 
campaign had “relied on second-rate lawyers who lack[ed] the 
skills” necessary to defend his actions before federal courts 
staffed with capable judges (even including, one might say, 
judges that he had appointed).70  She notes, for example that 
Trump appointee Matthew Braun basically eviscerated an oral 
argument offered by Giuliani, describing it as “strained legal 
arguments without merit and speculative accusations, unpled in 
the operative complaint and unsupported by evidence.”71  Thus, 
she writes, “[e]ven judges appointed by Mr. Trump have refused 
to throw their lots in with lawyers who can’t master the basic 
mechanics of lawyering.”72  To put it mildly, professional career 
attorneys at the Department of Justice, especially the OLC, have 
mastered those skills. 
So, what’s the problem?  I think it is captured by Ms. 
Newland’s use of the term “technocratic” in describing the 
difference between the semi-competent coterie of lawyers 
surrounding Trump and the dedicated professionals at the DOJ.73  
What does that term mean in this context.  I think a full answer 
requires us to go all the way back to Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, 
which examines the arts of rhetoric, of sophistry, taught by the 
titular character, the most esteemed teacher of sophistry.74  What 
 





74. See Steven Randall, Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Example of Plato’s 
“Gorgias”, 10 PHIL. & RHETORIC 165, 165 (1977).  
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is the measure of a successful sophist?  It is the ability to make 
“the lesser appear the greater,” that is, to present what should be 
a losing argument in such a way as to persuade the audience, 
including the judge, that it should in fact prevail.75  Socrates is not 
impressed, since he is committed to the importance of both truth 
and justice, neither of which is central to the perspective of the 
sophist.76  Indeed, Socrates is appalled that Gorgias makes no 
attempt, before admitting students to his school, to discern 
whether or not they are aware of the difference between justice 
and injustice or, for that matter, committed to the priority of truth 
over falsehood even when that might be costly to achieving 
success in one’s argument.77 
So, for Ms. Newland, the “technical” prowess of her fellow 
lawyers at the DOJ, perhaps within the Office of the Solicitor 
General as well, is revealed by their ability to gain judicial 
acceptance of policies that less skilled advocates might have 
failed at achieving.  Perhaps one might want to compare this to 
“putting lipstick on a pig.”  The pig might be more glamorous, 
but, after all, it remains a pig.  She no longer finds that admirable, 
and she therefore left her position and, presumably, her hopes to 
spend her career as a proud defender of the policies of the United 
States government.   
Students should read her column and address her worries.  Is 
she simply being self-servingly melodramatic?  Should we really 
wish the Department of Justice to be staffed by inferior lawyers 
who will be less successful at defending policies that, on political 
grounds, we object to?  Or should we instead adopt the reigning 
ideology of “adversarialism” that dictates that all sides in a legal 
conflict are entitled to the very best legal representation possible, 
which also seems to entail that one refrains from attributing to 
lawyers the moral or political positions that might be identified 
with their client.  Just as a doctor should use all of her professional 
skills to save Hitler, so, under this view, a lawyer should basically 
be indifferent to the actual consequences attached to victory or 
defeat for her client.   
 
75. See CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE, REASON’S DARK CHAMPIONS: CONSTRUCTIVE 
STRATEGIES OF SOPHISTIC ARGUMENT 21-22 (Thomas W. Benson ed., Univ. of S.C. Press 
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Killenbeck offers interesting contrasts between the 
Korematsu lawyers and those defending the Trump 
Administration’s travel ban in Hawaii.78  The former basically 
suppressed important factual evidence quite crucial to the overall 
case.  It is not merely that, like most lawyers, they offered only 
the most favorable readings of precedents or otherwise engaged 
in debatable readings of “the law.”  Instead, they failed in a basic 
duty of truthful representation of the facts before the Court.  With 
regard to defending the travel ban in Hawaii, however, no one 
was really ignorant of the bigotry that had been part of the Trump 
campaign or even the suggestion by Giuliani that the purpose of 
the “commission” was to supply legalistic rationalizations for a 
policy adopted for quite different reasons from those presented by 
the lawyers.  After all, isn’t it highly relevant that the Obama 
Administration could be cited for engaging in what was arguably 
at least somewhat similar concerns about travelers from the given 
countries?   
Mark Graber and I have in fact argued that judges should 
take into account the fact—and we treat it as a fact—that Donald 
J. Trump was uniquely unqualified to be President of the United 
States, not only on grounds of inexperience, but also, and more 
importantly, because he possesses such grievous character 
flaws.79  It is safe to say, however, that relatively few of our 
professional colleagues agree with us and that the legal academy, 
perhaps still in thrall to Herbert Wechsler, is committed to a 
notion of “neutral principles” that focuses almost exclusively on 
the institutional nature of the presidency and, therefore, not at all 
on the specific pathologies that might be present in a particular 
President.80  This is why a would-be career attorney like Ms. 
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Newland can remain in the Department of Justice as the 
presidency shifts from Barack Obama to Donald Trump.  As she 
put it, “I joined the department during the Obama administration, 
as a career attorney whose work was supposed to be independent 
of politics,” and she initially saw no real problems in remaining 
to work for the Trump Administration.81  She now says she was 
wrong.   
But wherein was her actual error?  Is it possible that she 
didn’t pay sufficient attention to the fact that attorneys 
representing the United States are always in effect committing 
themselves to the political goals of a particular administration? 
One suspects that she had little difficulty doing this with regard 
to Obama.  Obviously, that proved ultimately impossible only two 
years later.  How much leeway should we give any lawyer who is 
basically behaving as a sophist in the service of clients engaged 
in dubious behavior?  One might be hesitant to go too far down 
that road.  I myself certainly believe that even the most vicious 
among us are deserving of zealous representation when the state 
brings its awesome power to bear on them by attempting 
deprivation of liberty or even, as with capital punishment, their 
very lives.  But does the latitude I am willing to give the criminal 
defense attorney necessarily carry over into all legal 
representation?   
I am not really sure what I think the answer should be.  The 
one thing I am certain about, though, is that this is a question very 
much worth bringing to the attention of students embarking on 
the path to becoming lawyers.  They should be aware that 
lawyers—and lawyering—have been the objects of criticism as 
well as praise throughout the millennia.  Complementing the 
Socratic critique of “the-lawyer-as-sophist” is Jesus’ expression 
of “Woe unto you, lawyers!”82  Surely all of us can name lawyers 
we regard as heroes, worthy of emulation.  Many Americans 
clearly developed a special relationship with Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, “RBG.”  But surely it is worth asking how we 
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distinguish between our judicial heroes and those we might regard 
as villains, such as the author of Dred Scott, Chief Justice Roger 
Brooke Taney.  Is Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott demonstrably 
worse, save in its moral repugnance, than many other opinions of 
the Supreme Court that we treat with far greater respect—and do 
not assign to the anticanon?83 
V.  CONCLUSION: READ KILLENBECK CLOSELY 
So much more could be said, but I have gone on long 
enough.  I hope, though, that I have demonstrated my central 
point.  This is one of the most important articles ever published in 
any law review about the actuality of “doing” constitutional law.  
It should be read closely and genuinely grappled with, and not 
only in one’s capacity as an isolated reader.  No article more 
deserves to become the subject of genuine discussion and, 
perhaps, even heated argument. 
 
83. See MARK. A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
EVIL 4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (rebutting the case that it is easy to demonstrate the 
deficiencies of Taney’s opinion, whatever may be our own favorite approach to 
“constitutional interpretation.”). 
